| Interpretation
of Cultures (Basic Books Classics) by Clifford Geertz: The Interpretation
of Culture by Clifford Geertz is concerned with articulating a particular view
of what culture is, what role it plays in social life, and proposes a methodology
with which it should be studied. Geertz posits that culture should not be seen
as a science in search of law but instead as an interpretation in search of meaning.
"The concept of culture I espouse, and whose utility the essays below attempt
to demonstrate, is essentially a semiotic one. Believing, with Max Weber, that
man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself spun, I take culture
to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science
in search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning. It is explication
I am after, construing social expression on their surface enigmatical. But this
pronouncement, a doctrine in a clause demands itself some explication" (p5)
In part 1, Geertz begins with "Thick Description: Toward an Interpretative
Theory of Culture". This, the first essay in the series explains the complexity
of culture and what it is. Geertz explains his semiotics when he writes: "To
look at the symbolic dimensions of social action - art, religion, ideology, science,
law, morality, common sense - is not to turn away from the existential dilemmas
of life for some empyrean realm of deemotionalized forms: it is to plunge into
the midst of them. The essential vocations, but to make available to us answers
that others, guarding other sheep in other valleys, have given, and thus to include
them in the consultable record of what man has said." (p30) In part 2, Geertz
explores different dimensions of culture. Culture is a "template" or
"program". As individuals, we learn it then modify it. Geertz fails
to explain how these templates come to be and be modified but posits that they
become "common sense" of Platonic propositions and continue to be so.
"In attempting to launch such an integration from the anthropological side
and to reach, thereby, a more exact image of man, I want to propose two ideas.
The first of these is that culture is best seen not as complexes of concrete behavior
patterns - customs, usages, traditions, habit clusters - as has, by and large,
been the case up to now, but as a set of control mechanisms - plans, recipes,
rules, instructions (what computer engineers call "programs") - for
the governing of behavior. The second idea is that man is precisely the animal
most desperately dependent upon such extragenetic, outside-the-skin control mechanisms,
such as cultural programs, for ordering his behavior." (p44) Part 3 centers
on religion. Part 4 is the "thickest" sets of essays including "Ideology
As a Cultural System" and "The Politics of Meaning". In chapter
8, Geertz identifies what he sees as the phenomenon of ideology and how ideology
is vilified as a space for something that is epistemologically "Other".
"That the conception of ideology now regnant in the social sciences is a
thoroughly evaluative (that is, pejorative) one is readily enough demonstrated.
"[The study of ideology] deals with a mode of thinking which is thrown off
its proper course,"" (p196) The final section part 5 is where is
all come together for me. The last portion is his examination of Levi-Strauss
and Geertz's "breaking through the veil" in "Deep Play: Notes on
the Balinese Cockfight." I will deal with the latter first then tackle what
I see as his inability to see merit in the universals. As if transported by some
form of deja vu, I "feel" Geertz when he wrote about suddenly being
part of the milieu. In "The Cerebral Savage: On the work of Claude Levi-Strauss"
Geertz takes apart Levi-Strauss and his humanistic/scientific project. Geertz
sees this form of inquiry as bankrupt as anthropologists have "...taken refuge
in bloodless universals". (p5). Geertz elaborates on this premise in his
critique of Levi-Strauss and his work in "Tristes Tropique". Coming
out in a generation that was starting to reflect on "how" they were
writing rather than "what" they were writing about, Geertz's critique
is a reflection on Levi-Strauss' lack of self reflexivity. In a move that parallels
Foucault's in "The Order of Things", Geertz begins his anti-humanist
attack on a less reflective mode of writing that, on the inside causes epistemic
violence and on the outside is naive and self delusory. "In Levi-Strauss'
work the two faces of anthropology - as a way of going at the world and as a method
for uncovering lawful relations among empirical facts - are turned in toward one
another so as to force a direct confrontation between them rather than (as is
more common among ethnologists) out away from one another so as to avoid such
a confrontation and the inward stresses which go with it. This accounts both for
the power of his work and for its general appeal. It rings with boldness and a
kind of reckless candor. But it also accounts for the more intraprofessional suspicion
that what is presented as High Science may really be an ingenious and somewhat
roundabout attempt to defend a metaphysical position, advance argument, and serve
a moral cause." (p346-347). I agree with Geertz and Foucault with regards
to the complexity and need to effect a "thick" description. However,
much can still be learned from that scientific/humanist Man centered project.
The Enlightenment and its project has been credited for the wonderfully contradictory
le mission civilastrice which accord to Fanon is such a contradiction in that
the ideology that places man at the center, is responsible for so much killing.
If Levi-Strauss is doing the same thing theoretically, then he is complicit in
this move to reinforce placing Man at the center and to submit us to its results.
With Geertz and Foucault we can hopefully find a more "enlightened"
middle ground. |