Wei Jingsheng

"I say without the slightest remorse that we would not have made economic progress if we had not intervened in very personal matters - who your neighbor is, how you live, the noise you make, how you spit, or what language you use. We decide what’s right. Never mind what the people think."

Lee Kuan Yew

"Asia has a rich heritage of democracy-oriented philosophies and traditions. Asia has already made great strides towards democratization and possessed the necessary conditions to develop democracy even beyond the level of the West. Asia should lose no time in firmly establishing democracy and strengthening human rights. The biggest obstacle is not its cultural heritage but the resistance of authoritarian rulers and their apologists. Culture is not necessarily our destiny. Democracy is."

Kim Dae Jung

INTRODUCTION

As a Filipino abroad, I was struck by what I perceived as a lack of family unity in the daily affairs of western people. In all fairness, it would simply prove to be a projection of my own inner anxiety. The dissonance I was experiencing was viewed, as an assault on what my family conceded was a western dilution of our treasured "Asian values." I left the Philippines in 1982. While in the United States of America, I began to experience what seemed like disintegration within my own family. Moreover, I felt that the same phenomenon was affecting other families in the larger Filipino community as well. Many second generation young Filipino-Americans formulated independent minded notions and where branching out on their own. What did all this mean? What effect did it have on the old as well as the new generation? It seemed as if our world was coming apart in the seams.

In 1989 I moved to Canada, the land of multiculturalism. A little older and a little wiser, I started to consider multiculturalism a bit more seriously. I consider that maybe the criticisms lodged against multiculturalism might be just a convenient reason to dodge an earnest understanding of my culture. While multiculturalism remains a matter for weighty discourse, it is vital also to examine in some detail just what exactly it is that my culture was offering in terms of alternate values or political systems. The political and economic changes in the old country, in such a massive scale and in such a short time, has left a permanent mark on Asia and probably the West as well.

Modernity and its efficient techniques of production and communication are seen as essential for survival in all areas of the world. The race to the bottom is on in most parts of East Asia, and this I find disturbing. Refitting work methods and management techniques as evolved by western cultures is part of the every day in East Asia today. It is this same western influence on Asian countries that is the focus of serious discussion and debate. It is not so much the question of wanting economic development but it is the price of modernization that is being discussed. Just about every government in Asia embraces (or want to emulate) the rapid growth that only a modernizing nation can yield. Which brings me to the focus of this paper, on issues relating to so called "Asian values" held by specific Asian nations that come into conflict with ideals of human rights and democratic principles. Asian countries resist what they see as western culture imposing universal values to which all peoples must subscribe.

THE DISCOURSE OF ASIAN VALUES

Taking a Postmodern approach to the discourse of "Asian values" starts with the understanding that culture is a social construction.(1) Truth is a matter of perspective, and perspectives are a byproduct of social interchange or discourse.(2) What comes out of this discourse is a product of power relations and this is at the heart of the discourse of "Asian values." The discourse is a crucial one. In the year of the 50th Anniversary of the ratification of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights(3), this discourse challenges the core of a belief system that categorically proclaims human rights as transcendent and universal. It is argued that these human rights were born, evolved and articulated over the last few centuries in the United States and Europe. Is the understanding for what has been differentiated as Asian values a reality or a construction of a few despots who wish to remain in power and dominate the discourse with the least amount of integrity, sensitivity, and creativity? Chris Patten writes:

Myths about Asian social and economic development abound. Where, for a start, are we talking about? Asia is not a single entity. As a continent Asia includes about 3 billion people, hundreds of races, cultures and languages. (20) One other myth deserves dissection. Is Asia’s economic renaissance explained by the continent’s own unique values? This argument is put with bullying panache by some leaders of an authoritarian disposition to justify the curbs placed on the freedoms of those they rule. They contend that Asia has turned its back on the decadent liberalism of the West, which encourages feckless individualism and impoverishing license. Asian success is based, so the theory continues, on Confucian discipline and order. GDP growth requires the smack of firm government, free from criticism or second-guessing by irresponsible journalists and unenlightened political opponents. (20) Europe, America and Asia are not identical, but nor are the countries within them. To talk of Asian values requires one to explain away the differences between democracy in India and market Leninism in China; between a free press in the Philippines and Hong Kong (still) and a controlled media in other places; between corruption in many Asian countries and clean government in Singapore. How do we lump under one collective headline Malay Muslims, Japanese Zen Buddhists, Philippine Catholics and Bali’s inheritance of Hindu culture? (20) (4)

The quote brings about a whole range interesting complexities to the discourse of universal rights in general and so called Asian values in particular. Firstly, are cultural experiences really so different that no ethical common ground can be found among peoples of different races, religions or ethnicity? Second, if Asian values are recognized as a distinct human rights category, to what extent can moral and cultural relativism extend? The Economist asserts that the size and diversity of Asia is the main challenge facing advocates of "Asian values":

They conclude that culture is so imprecise and changeable a phenomenon that it explains less than most people realize. (23) The upshot, for Mr. Lewis, is clear enough. "In modern times," he writes: "The dominating factor in the consciousness of most Middle Easterners has been the impact of Europe, later of the West more generally, and the transformation-some would say dislocation-which it has brought.’’ Mr. Lewis has put his finger on the most important and least studied aspect of cultural identity: how it changes. (23) Global politics is being reconfigured along cultural lines. (24) The archetypal modern pronouncement of this view was Max Weber’s investigation of the Protestant work ethic. (24) "A nation’s well-being, as well as its ability to compete, is conditioned by a single, pervasive cultural characteristic: the level of trust inherent in the society,’’ he says. Mr. Fukuyama argues that "low-trust’’ societies such as China, France and Italy - where close relations between people do not extend much beyond the family-are poor at generating large, complex social institutions like multinational corporations; so they are at a competitive disadvantage compared with "high-trust" nations such as Germany, Japan and the United States. (25) There are dozens of examples of misperception in international relations, ranging from Japanese-American trade disputes to the misreading of Saddam Hussein’s intentions in the weeks before he attacked Kuwait. (25) Is the Catholic Philippines western or Asian? (25) (5)

Regionalizing the discourse makes us consider dichotomies of East and West or Asian, African European or South American. Do we extend the discourse to include Filipino, Singaporean or Chinese values? Are all the cultures I just outlined so different that all should be accepted as legitimate and distinct base line of morality above international human rights base line? I don’t think so. The end of the Cold War has not, unfortunately, produced the rise universal democracy as so long expected. Conversely, the superpower power play may have even galvanized some states to take a hard line stance by declaring their independence and distinctiveness from Western political models. Some countries have embraced the western economic model and its modernization only to reject the values systems attached to it that allow for its long term stability.

THE POWER RELATIONS IN THE DISCOURSE OF ASIAN VALUES

Rapid economic growth has changed the dynamics of East/West relations. No longer dependent of Western patrons for military support, East Asian leaders are challenging western views as alien ideologies, especially in the arena of government and human rights, by raising the specter of traditional "Asian values." This revival of what are described as "Asian values" is seen most strongly in Singapore as well as China. Tung Chee-Hwa assures the world that the new Hong Kong government will uphold human rights:

For the Asian executives, the top seven values are: hard work, respect for learning, honesty, openness to new ideas, accountability, self-discipline, self-reliance. (12) For the North American executives, the top seven values are: freedom of expression, personal freedom, self-reliance, individual rights, hard work, personal achievement, thinking for one’s self. (12) Obviously, the values held by the Asian executives and American executives in terms of priorities and emphasis are different. Not only are Asian executives different from American executives, but Asians are different from Americans because of our upbringing culture and history. (12) For the past 155 years, we have been strongly influenced by Western culture, education and values. Indeed, much of the success of Hong Kong today is attributable to the rule of law, Western systems of governance and the freedoms we enjoy. (12) Now, as we move forward, there is a need for us to renew our commitment to the values we hold dear. These values have been with us for thousands of years and are as relevant today as they have ever been: trust, love and respect for our family and our elders; integrity, honesty and loyalty toward all; commitment to education; a belief in order and stability; an emphasis on obligations to the community rather than rights of the individual; a preference for consultation rather than confrontation. These are some of the shared values, which make our society more cohesive. Together with a strong identity, they will provide us with clarity of direction and unity of purpose. In Hong Kong, we can combine the best of the East and the West, because in so doing, each and every one will become a better person and in turn make our society much stronger and a society which we and our future generations will be very proud of. (13) (6)

"Asian values" has found some popular outcry in both these countries. This apparent contradiction of political convergence of a once Maoist regime and a once staunchly anti Communist government speaks loudly to the notion that the new fondness for so called old traditions may be nothing more than façade for continued authoritarianism. Furthermore, this calls to question notions of expediency as strong-arm tactics are employed as opposed to true democratic conciliation. It conveniently creates yet another external threat forcing the country to huddle together against the influences of the demonized West. Singapore’s rationalizations are clearly self-serving in its selective adaptation of modernization. Embracing Western innovations that have fostered economic growth, while at the same time casting aside political liberties, is doubtful in theory and not feasible on a practical level in the long run.

Before delving head and shoulders into the myth of "Asian values," the question should revisit is whether there really is an "Asia" subscribing to shared values. Asia’s immense area itself, from Manila to Mandalay, from Lhasa to Tokyo, counters any conception of a common value system that transcends lands of diverse racial, ethnic, cultural, and religious plurality. Characterized by differences in histories and beliefs of peoples across Asian leaders bolster a misperception of a shared commonality satisfactory to produce an identifiable coherent value system.

THE MYTH OF ASIAN VALUES

The claim of distinctly "Asian values" has caught popular attention in the intellectual community in the West as well as selected pockets in Asia. Its most ardent champions are former Singaporean leader Lee Kuan Yew and his followers (7), who advance alternative, so called "Asian values" against what they describe as the decadence and corruption of Western societies. There is widespread consensus that so-called "Asian values" are merely a revisiting of the old standard "Protestant Work Ethic." (8) The Singaporean school adopted Confucian and neo-Confucian values, although constructed to conform to Lee Kuan Yew’s political vision, as the definition of "Asian values." Amartya Sen writes:

The violation of freedom and democracy in different parts of the world continues today, if not as comprehensively as in Paine’s time. There is a difference, though. A new class of arguments has emerged that deny the universal importance of these freedoms. The most prominent of these contentions is the claim that "Asian values" do not regard freedom to be important in the way that it is regarded in the West. Given this difference in value systems--the argument runs--Asia must be faithful to its own system of philosophical and political priorities. (33) The foreign minister of Singapore warned that: "universal recognition of the ideal of human rights can be harmful if universalism is used to deny or mask the reality of diversity." The Chinese delegation played a leading role in emphasizing the regional differences, and in making sure that the prescriptive framework adopted in the declarations made room for regional diversity. The Chinese foreign minister even put on record the proposition, apparently applicable in China and elsewhere, that "Individuals must put the states’ rights before their own." (33) Does authoritarianism really work so well? It is certainly true that some relatively authoritarian states (such as South Korea, Lee’s Singapore, and post-reform China) have had faster rates of economic growth than many less authoritarian ones (such as India, Costa Rica or Jamaica). But the "Lee hypothesis" is based on very selective and limited information, rather than on any general statistical testing over the wide-ranging data that are available. We cannot really take the high economic growth of China or South Korea in Asia as "proof positive" that authoritarianism does better in promoting economic growth -- any more than we can draw the opposite conclusion on the basis of the fact that Botswana, the fastest growing African country (and one of the fastest growing countries in the world), has been a oasis of democracy in that unhappy continent. Much depends on the precise circumstances. (34) (9)

Claims are that the Singaporean elite’s ability to propel polemics to the West is the result of education offered by British imperialists. This calls me question whether this same group is representative of and can speak on behalf of Tibetan Buddhists, Filipino Muslims or East Timor Catholics? To suggest that Chinese Confucian values exemplify "Asian values" is, to say the least, essentialist. Conversely, to be fair, the same thing could be said of arrogant Western missionaries who held Christianity as the saving grace for Asia. If the feasibility of cohesive "Asian values" is disproved, what is the discussion about? The underlying philosophical argument of "Asian values" could have widespread consequences over the universality of human rights as outlined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It is important to keep in mind that even the Singaporean school’s claim to Confucian theory as the basis for its authoritarianism is open to deconstruction.

The Singaporean school shares a view with other autocrats all over the world, or at least those who seek to rationalize their rule in the most narcissistic terms. The maxim is that the rulers, by heredity, education, divine right or some other endowments, are justified in exercising political power without the expressed will of the people. What flows from this is that only rulers know what is best for the masses far better than the masses know what is good for the masses themselves. The outcome is a form of paternalism evolved into a form of benevolent dictatorship without the mandate of the people.

Can autocrats really make a claim for exemption from the will of the people, calling to the fore a Confucian or neo-Confucian theory that the Singapore school espouses as the foundation for its version of "Asian values?" Ironically, some Confucian scholars would agree. However, the egalitarian predisposition in traditional Confucian society and the existence of a bureaucracy jointly checked rulers’ privilege. The historical existence of a legal framework in China and Korea that provided, at least theoretically, equality before the law, also placed boundaries on leaders’ powers. It has become a game of interpretation. Buddhist teachings as well call leaders to task to act in the best interests of their minions and avoid anything that might cause them harm. To identify these traditions as democratic would be ludicrous; it is clear though that Confucian as well as other Asian traditions sought tangible restrictions on the monarch’s omnipotence that provided grounds for a leader’s expulsion. If people languished due to poor governance, the "mandate of heaven" that the monarch held as his justification to power could be revoked. It would be within the people’s rights to depose such a leader.

Changes of leadership under such vague circumstances are bound to be chaotic, and despite the so called Asian desire for "orderliness," succession struggles have beleaguered Asian countries just as much as European and African countries. The desire for the well organized continues to be shaken as the economic foundations of Asian societies are fundamentally transformed. Economic transformation is causing profound changes in what was traditionally an agrarian organizational setup and the social structures that grew around that way of life over generations (10). What is workable for agrarian societies is not necessarily workable in industrialized, information or service based societies. It is well-founded to call to question whether the Singapore school of "Asian values" is really just a reaction to things Western and is really just heavy handedness, in their attempt to come to terms with the very real anxiety of changes to modernization. Modernization has always aroused resistance, and whether one likes it or not, the introduction of technology has always produced very real cultural transformation. There is something to the notion that no culture is changeless. Globalization has opened up human societies to influence and change, and cultures that cannot adapt seem wither and die.

On the other end of the spectrum, Asian democrats declare that Asian societies are not only capable of democratizing but as a matter of survival have to, in an information or service based global economy. Korean scion and former democratic activist Kim Dae Jung outlined what he sees as the Asian historic basis for democracy and asserts:

Many experts have acknowledged that this new economic world order requires guaranteed freedom of information and creativity. These things are possible only in a democratic society. Thus Asia has no practical alternative to democracy; it is a matter of survival in an age of intensifying global economic competition. The world economy’s changes have already meant a greater and easier flow of information, which has helped Asia’s democratization process. (11)

The sprouting of several of information sources and increased access to them also encourages more independent thought. Media coverage and Internet access can no longer be easily suppressed even by a regime as efficient as Singapore’s. The mass circulation and transfer of news, opinion and information through advanced technical mechanisms such as direct satellite television, and as I mentioned above the Internet, is increasingly difficult to suppress. State-of-the-art information networks are bringing knowledge and information to Asian democracy and human rights activists who are challenging authoritarian rulers’ self-assumed mandate of heaven.

Lee Kuan Yew and the Singaporean school contend that emphasis on individual liberties has caused the deterioration in modern society, a sentiment that is mirrored by conservative Western pundits. Arthur Schlesinger Jr., however, is not one of them and he writes that:

The whole point in Confucianism is to achieve "the right balance between the individual and the group." But this does not answer the question how Confucianism weighs the competing claims. (2) The West inclines toward the individual, the East toward the group. Human dignity and autonomy are fulfilled in the one instance by independence and self-reliance, in the other by submission to the larger community. Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore, Mahathir Mohamad of Malaysia and Kazuo Ogura of the Japanese foreign ministry are forthright in calling for "the Asianization of Asia" and asserting an Asian identity and "Asian values" of discipline and order against the self-indulgence of the feckless and decadent West. (2) In practice, one tradition favors democracy, the other, as Professor de Bary concedes, favors authoritarianism. And, as Professor de Bary rightly notes, it is an illusion to suppose that "political liberalization will necessarily follow as a result of economic liberalization." This proposition is "not warranted either by Chinese history or recent experience." Culture remains more potent than free-market economics. (2) In chapter 5 of The Cycles of American History (1986), "Human Rights and the American Tradition," I write, "If the assertion that such rights are universal, and not merely the local prejudice of Caucasion societies bordering the North Atlantic, implies racial arrogance. The limitation of these rights [to Europe and North America] implies that nonwhite people are incapable of appreciating due process, personal liberty and self-government -- racial arrogance as well." I quote a Peking wall poster: "We cannot tolerate that human rights and democracy are only slogans of the western bourgeoisie, and [that] the eastern proletariat only needs dictatorship"; and Raul Manglapus of the Philippines: "Human rights are not a western discovery."(3) (12)

Anyone who walks the streets of many major Western cities today certainly is aware that there are many dismaying problems and there are well-founded criticisms to be made concerning the condition of Western society. Conversely though, the West equally does not hold the monopoly on the good, the bad or the ugly. A fleeting glance at the problems affecting East Asia over the last few years reveals: wholesale cultural and racial destruction (i.e., genocide in Tibet), environmental damage, drug addiction, religious persecution, prostitution, torture and extravagant corruption. Max Skidmore writes about corruption in Hong Kong and expresses caution regarding the rise of what was then the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC):

The view one takes of this depends upon many things. The system perhaps had its advantages. Some observers might also have concluded that it represented Asian values rather than corruption. Davies and Roberts present a perceptive discussion of this position. If a person uses an office to reward in return for a bribe, that is corrupt. Nevertheless, there are those who would argue that such a definition depends upon a specific notion of office and that where a different idea prevails, gifts to officials may be acceptable. There, "the giving and receiving of gifts by an official should not be constructed as an inducement to act in certain ways, but rather as a recognition of that official’s standing by both parties. If in fact the official then acts in ways which benefit the giver of the gift, this is not corrupt, but a cementing of the hierarchy to which both parties belong." This argument would appeal to those in the West who wish to avoid the imposition of Western standards upon other cultures. (119) However commendable the motives of those who hold this view may be, their assumptions, Davies and Roberts point out, are erroneous. One might even conclude that their position thus is condescending. Their "view of the matter has never been part of colonial, or Confucian, understanding. The idea that such a treatment of office is corrupt is common to both traditions. Equally, corruption as described above is common to both." (119) "It is clear that beyond a certain point, widespread bribery of officials becomes counterproductive. It brings the impartiality of a governmental and legal system into question and thereby undermines both efficacy and legitimacy." (119) (13)

This scenario scarcely provides comfort that "Asian values" are a step forward toward a sense of decency and inherent dignity. Respect for universal human rights would unquestionably promote or prevent some of this suffering. If venerated in practice as much as in theory, Confucian values, even as Biblical tenets would certainly give us a better world. Unfortunately, we have not seen Western and so-called "Asian values" systems prove themselves favorable at adapting to the modern age. Conventionally, associations among individuals in small groups, with the family at the center, provided the essential grounding for any society.

MODERNIZATION AND THE RULE OF LAW ON ASIAN VALUES

Modernization has certainly changed several things, the family dynamic is certainly a casualty and the transformation to societies of speedy communications and social mobility has drastically elevated personal autonomy. On the other hand, in Confucianism sentiments of civility are a guiding fundamental guideline for social interaction that has evolved in predominantly agrarian societies. Controversy would be resolved without state intervention, which was all to the good in a society where adjudicators might be miles away. The rule of law had existed in Confucian philosophy, but more as a background to working out disputes in conformity to a cooperative and recognized morality and practices as such.

The vision of a deeply moral foundation embedded on a shared cultural heritage guiding individuals’ interaction with each other is clearly desirable. However, as societies become more diverse and complex, this gets increasingly difficult to do. Modernization is that complexity that has cut off people’s traditional ties to the land, to the family, to the group and to values that shaped pre-industrial societies. In their place, a new social dynamic has evolved that we have yet to ascertain the effects of. In the East and in the West, societies are anxious in various degrees both from the lack of civility in interactions among individuals and the infringement of the state that deny individual rights. The "Asian values" posited by the Singaporean school should be outside the realm of the state. It is interesting to compare this to the Western notion of civil society. Civil society sets the stage for individuals to maintain their own social infrastructure without the heavy hand of the state. Individuals form associations based on common values or goals that do not rely on the state to provide for them. Civil society functions optimally in an open society. There are visions offered by both Confucian civility and Western civility where basic relationships among individuals flourish without state restraints. Both share a set of shared values that notify and coordinate these relationships. In Confucian systems, it is argued, it is the philosophical foundations of filial piety while in Western the shared values are legislated in the rule of law.

Without an agreed basis for law and order it would be almost impossible for society to function effectively and equitably. Homogenous societies can stress orderliness based on shared single cultural history. In this framework, the civility that is a good fortune to any society is easier to achieve. Diversity is the root of complexity and complexity becomes a challenge to manage as it takes creative thinking and a sense of fair play. As a logical conclusion, a diverse, modern and complex society must, if it wishes to maintain civility call into play the rule of law that guarantees individual rights that serves as an overarching premise to cultural values that seem irreconcilable. Cultural mingling deeply alters culture-specific values and brings traditional practices to the test (14). Repressive regimes may today press Orwellian indoctrination through controlled education and media, but the state’s technological advantage is fading in the face of ever more powerful media. The challenge for repressive governments in a more sophisticated society is to manufacture consent where once it was easier. In short, the idea of determine the boundaries of values on a geographic premise in light of globalization that has evolved what I see as a world community replete with complex and diverse societies is an oxymoron. Dispossessed of its capability to retain out-of-date notions, it seems unavoidable that any society will suffer a diminishing distinctive identity.

THE OTHER VOICE ON ASIAN VALUES

The Singaporean school’s claim that advocacy to the notion of and international human rights base line is anathema to traditional "Asian values" and ruinous to Asian culture is repudiated by history and modernization:

Singapore is about to invest billions in public transport, at the same time as making it even harder to buy a car. This is a country that is tough on cars, and tough on the causes of cars. (17) But it is also, famously, the country where peeing in lifts and spitting are punishable offenses, as is homosexual "cruising". The smack of firm government is administered not just with a particularly nasty form of carting (at intervals, to allow swelling), but with the noose and interrogations that result in successful "confessions." Singaporeans stay in line, but apparently not without encouragement. (17) Lee Kuan Yew, the architect of modern Singapore, put it this way in 1987: "I say without the slightest remorse that we would not have made economic progress if we had not intervened in very personal matters - who your neighbor is, how you live, the noise you make, how you spit, or what language you use. We decide what’s right. Never mind what the people think." (17) (15)

Yet another voice, the voice of Asian human rights leaders and the activist movement also dispute such a notion. Asian NGOs have also refuted their government’s claim that human rights are incompatible with Asian Values. Many of these representatives of Asian civil society have asserted that this emphasis on Asian Values in conflict with human rights is an attempt by authoritarian governments to legitimize their corrupt regimes (16). A growing tide of people power has surfaced and millions of Asians have joined movements and risked their lives and fortunes to demand respect for their rights is a prime confirmation that despots that "Asian values" are not necessarily the will of the people. Witness the historic struggle of pro-democracy movement students at Tiananmen Square and the people power revolution that deposed one-time dictator Ferdinand Marcos and his crowd of cronies in the mid 1980’s. In 1978, Wei Jingsheng threw himself into the democratic movement of the "Beijing Spring" (also known as the "Democracy Wall" movement) in which posters demanding democracy, human rights and freedom appeared on a brick wall along the sidewalk of Beijing’s western district of Sidan. Among his writings at the time was "The fifth modernization," in which he asserted that without real democracy, the government’s plan of modernization was bound to fail.

Established means of reconciling societal values are evolving along with rising wealth and modernization. Predictably, to counter this rising tide brings out the worst in authoritarian tendencies to suppress all this with swiftness and alacrity. Nonetheless people continue to call for an ever-increasing stake in governance and resolutions that affect them. New forms of representation evolves with distinct cultural flavor, and may or may not closely reflect those in English or American models. The underlying commonality will be that it is the mandate should reflect the will of the people, and not the will of a small minority, the delivery of this will be facilitated by the rule of law.

The never-ending challenge around the world is centered on who decides what constitutes basic human rights. As it stands today, the voices against the universality of human rights is heard from despots who have much to gain by maintaining repressive systems. Several, as in Singapore, make a travesty of the rule of law by using the courts as a method of control rather than a means for justice. Christopher Lingle writes:

My experience as a student of Asia, a foreign resident in Singapore, an employee of the regime’s university, and finally as a defendant in a well-publicized trial there have led me to a different conclusion: The regime in Singapore has developed an insidious new form of authoritarianism." (46) [He continues to outline that he] "was soon being investigated and, the following January, was found guilty in absentia of making statements that scandalized Singapore’s judicial system. To prove that my comments were directed at Singapore, the prosecution cited 11 cases where members of the ruling party had sued opposition politicians, many of whom were bankrupted. It thus demonstrated both its case and mine. Lee Kuan Yew, the strongman-ruler and former Prime Minister, sued me for libel. Unsurprisingly, he obtained a judgment against me (again in absentia) in the High Court. The judge set the damages based upon a separate out-of-court settlement reached by the plaintiff. (46)" (17)

Are there basic civil and political liberties that Asians really feel they are better without? Maybe the only way to find out is to put that question to Asians like myself. A good place to start would be in Singapore, where an educated and prosperous populace might be queried by referendum if they prefer political imprisonment, suppression of the press and denial of free expression and association (18). The extent of human experience has produced a bountiful and engaging rainbow of cultures representative of their time and space of outgrowth. Unfortunately, that fascinating and playful era is washed away in the sea of technological change and has forever change the playing field and the way people relate to each other.

CONCLUSION

Should cultural diversity end, this world would be a far bleaker place. Cultural change, however, is inevitable. Despots that violate basic human rights must not be allowed to deviate from universal standards on the basis of constructed histories of the dominant faction in the discourse. Rationalizations that particular values systems exclude protection of basic human rights are dubious to say the least. Respect for rights under the rule of law is probably the only way to maintain law and order in a world that will continue to experience and of increase diversity and complexity.

Coming back to where I started, as a Filipino abroad. What do I counsel those of a generation who seem lost in the sea of confusion. We should embrace the change and live dangerously. Dangerously in the sense that we should embrace the change that will free us from the will of others. As we grow ever more sophisticated the rules will change and evolve and that rather than the imposition by guilt or stick, a new more profound sense of understanding should prevail. As we move in the maelstrom of modernity, we cannot move to the future while holding on the past. We move into the future without the heavy hand of authoritarianism but with the soft hand of universal responsibility, the rule of law and a mutual respect of our inherent dignity as human beings.

Endnotes:

¹It can be argued that this is not a postmodern discovery; in fact it is something of a tautology. "Self" as a social construction is particularly postmodernist; "culture", as social construction is not new.

²Anderson, Walter Truett (Editor) The Truth about the Truth: De-Confusing and Re-Constructing the Postmodern World New York, New York, G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1995 p. 163 - the line actually appears in "Studying Consciousness in the Postmodern Age", an article by Stanley Krippner and Michael Winkler.

³The International Bill of Human rights, (1993) United Nations, New York. This portion actually refers to the section: "Universal Declaration of Human Rights" p. 7

⁴ Patten writes further on the issue: "If we accept the concept of Asian values, we have to deny the universality of human rights. But free speech is free speech. A hit on the head with a riot stick raises a bruise wherever you are. It is racist to suggest that the values of freedom do not matter to Asians, many of whom-as Malaysia’s deputy prime minister, Anwar Ibrahim, has argued-fought and died for liberty in the struggle for national independence. Asian Canutes should note that a more accountable and participative government is invariably the consequence sooner or later of economic growth and the opening of markets. (21)" Patten, Chris "Beyond the myths: Chris Patten, the British governor who in June will return Hong Kong to China, argues that economic success and political liberalism will converge" Economist, 1/4/97, Vol. 342 Issue 7998, p. 19

⁵ "If you doubt it, consider the case of China and the "Confucian tradition’’ (a sort of proxy for Asian values). China has been at various times the world’s most prosperous country and also one of its poorest. It has had periods of great scientific innovation and times of technological backwardness and isolation. Accounts of the Confucian tradition have tracked this path. Nowadays, what seems important about the tradition is its encouragement of hard work, savings and investment for the future, plus its emphasis on co-operation towards a single end. All these features have been adduced to explain why the tradition has helped Asian growth. (27) To Max Weber, however, the same tradition seemed entirely different. He argued that the Confucian insistence on obedience to parental authority discouraged competition and innovation and hence inhibited economic success. And China is not the only country to have been systematically misdiagnosed in this way. In countries as varied as Japan, India, Ghana and South Korea, notions of cultural determination of economic performance have been proved routinely wrong (in 1945, India and Ghana were expected to do best of the four-partly because of their supposed cultural inheritance). (27)" "The man in the Baghdad cafe. Which ‘civilization’ you belong to matters less than you might think" Economist, 11/09/96, Vol. 341 Issue 7991, p23

⁶ Ironically in the same text he refers Hong Kong’s commitment to human rights: "I am firmly committed to safeguarding the rights of the individual and freedoms of the individual in Hong Kong which we currently enjoy. I believe this effort is in the interest of the public at large and is consistent with the vision of a society in Hong Kong we feel proud of." (13) (Emphasis mine) Chee-Hwa, Tung "Making money, avoiding disorder. (cover story) Tung Chee-Hwa is Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region" New Perspectives Quarterly, Summer 97, Vol. 14 Issue 3

⁷Zakaria, Fareed "Culture Is Destiny: A conversation with Lee Kuan Yew" Foreign Affairs, (March/April 1994), Volume 73 No. 2 p. 109

⁸ Blackburn, Kevin "Does the West need to learn ‘Asian values’? To match the economic dynamism of the Asian Tigers, should we try to adopt ‘Asian values’ or relearn our own?" IPA Review, 1994, Vol. 47 Issue 2, p. 35

⁹On the same note, Amartya Sen writes that to generalize by region would be, to say the least, crude: "The recent Indian experience also shows that what is needed for generating faster economic growth is a friendlier economic climate rather than a harsher political system. (34) I have discussed (in these pages and in my book Resources, Values, and Development) the remarkable fact that, in the terrible history of famines in the world, no substantial famine has ever occurred in any independent and democratic country with a relatively free press. (34) While this connection is clearest in the case of famine prevention, the positive role of political and civil rights applies to the prevention of economic and social disasters generally. (35) Asia is where about 60 percent of the world’s population lives. What can we take to be the values of so vast a region, with so much diversity? It is important to state at the outset that there are no quintessential values that separate the Asians as a group from people in the rest of the world and which fit all parts of this immensely large and heterogeneous population. The temptation to see Asia as a single unit reveals a distinctly Eurocentric perspective. Indeed, the term "the Orient," which was widely used for a long time to mean essentially what Asia means today, referred to the positional vision of Europe, as it contemplated the direction of the rising sun. (35) In fact, even east Asia itself has much diversity, and there are many variations to be found between Japan and China and Korea and other parts of east Asia. (35) Cultures and traditions overlap in regions such as east Asia and even within countries such as Japan or China or Korea, and attempts at generalization about "Asian values" (with forceful and often brutal implications for masses of people in this region with diverse faiths, convictions, and commitments) cannot but be extremely crude. (35) (Emphasis mine) In Buddhist tradition, great importance is attached to freedom, and the traditions of earlier Indian thinking to which Buddhist thoughts relate allow much room for volition and free choice. Nobility of conduct has to be achieved in freedom, and even the ideas of liberation (such as moksha) include this feature. The presence of these elements in Buddhist thought does not obliterate the importance of the discipline emphasized by Confucianism, but it would be a mistake to take Confucianism to be the only tradition in Asia--or in China. Since so much of the contemporary authoritarian interpretation of Asian values concentrates on Confucianism, this diversity is particularly worth emphasizing. (37) Confucius did not recommend blind allegiance to the state. (37)" Sen, Amartya "Human rights and Asian values. (cover story) What Lee Kuan Yew and Li Peng don’t understand about Asia" New Republic, 07/14 & 07/21/97, Vol. 217 Issue 2/3, p. 33

¹⁰ "Fings ain’t wot they used to be. In Asia’s newly rich countries, the family is beginning to suffer some of the strains that have long troubled western societies." Economist, 5/28/94, Vol. 331 Issue 7865, p. 31

¹¹Kim Dae Jung "Is Culture Destiny? The Myth of Asia’s Anti-Democratic Values - A Response to Lee Kuan Yew" Foreign Affairs, (November/December 1994), Volume 73 No. 6 p. 192 - 193

¹²Schlesinger Jr., Arthur "Multiculturalism and human rights." Freedom Review, Sep/Oct 95, Vol. 26 Issue 5, p. 2

¹³"Departing from British tradition and looking to Asian precedents, much of the ordinance "was based on Singaporean and Ceylonese [Sri Lankan] legislation."[11] The Anti-Corruption Branch of the police received authority to enforce the ordinance. (120) "That ICAC officers if they so wish can intrude vigorously into the private lives and affairs of practically every resident in Hong Kong. For example ICAC officers are empowered to search premises by virtue of a warrant signed by their Commissioner and not necessarily by a Magistrate. For certain offenses the onus rests on the defendant to prove his innocence."" (123) Skidmore, Max J. "Promise and peril in combating corruption: Hong Kong’s ICAC." Annals of the American Academy of Political & Social Science, Sep 96, Vol. 547, p. 118

¹⁴"Despite the professed eagerness of governments like Singapore’s and Malaysia’s to preserve "Asian values", the Hard Rock Cafe’s unadulterated Americana has gone down well. Even the Chinese seem relaxed at the prospect of some Hard Rock on their doorsteps." "It’s only Rock ‘n’ rice." Economist, 4/9/94, Vol. 331 Issue 7858 p. 71

¹⁵Webb, Ben "The less-than-super model. Ben Webb on the authoritarian downside of Singapore’s economic success." New Statesman & Society, 1/26/96, Vol. 9 Issue 387

¹⁶For Asian NGOs’ reaction to the governmental Bangkok Declaration, see Our Voice: Bangkok NGO Declaration on Human Rights. Reports of the Asia Pacific NGO Conference on Human Rights and NGOs’ Statements to the Asia Regional Meeting (Bangkok: Asian Cultural Forum on Development, 1993.)

¹⁷Lingle, Christopher "Communitarian capitalism. Just how "free" is Singapore’s free market?" Reason, Oct 96, Vol. 28 Issue 5, p. 46

¹⁸For Asian NGOs’ reaction to the governmental Bangkok Declaration, see Our Voice: Bangkok NGO Declaration on Human Rights. Reports of the Asia Pacific NGO Conference on Human Rights and NGOs’ Statements to the Asia Regional Meeting (Bangkok: Asian Cultural Forum on Development, 1993.). Moreover, Chris Lingle further explains that: Speaking of locals, most citizens live in publicly provided housing. Indeed, the government still owns the bulk of developed and undeveloped property. There is also a requirement for the annual renewal of local business licenses -- a subtle way to ensure that business owners toe the government line. Perhaps the most notable element of government control over the economy is in the mandatory pension scheme (Central Provident Fund or CPF), which places about 40 percent of total labor earnings into the hands of government managers. (47) Despite claims that "Asian values" provide a culturally specific impetus for growth, there are indications that some traditional Asian institutions may eventually impose constraints on growth. For example, "saving face" and guanxi (institutionalized crony networking) result in zero-sum exchanges that could inhibit the efficient use of scarce economic resources. (48) Lingle, Christopher "Communitarian capitalism. Just how "free" is Singapore’s free market?" Reason, Oct 96, Vol. 28 Issue 5, p. 46

-oOo-

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